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Abstract
In standard macroeconomic models, the two objectives in the Federal Reserve's dual
mandate|full employment and price stability|are closely intertwined. We motivate
and estimate an alternative model in which long-term unemployment varies endoge-
nously over the business cycle but does not aect price ination. In this new model, an
increase in long-term unemployment as a share of total unemployment creates short-term
tradeos for optimal monetary policy and a wedge in the dual mandate. In particular,
faced with high long-term unemployment following the Great Recession, optimal mone-
tary policy would allow ination to overshoot its target more than in standard models.
Eric Swanson and Rob Valletta provided helpful comments, and Ben Pyle supplied excellent research
assistance. The views expressed in this paper are the authors and do not necessarily reect those of others in
the Federal Reserve System.
ye-mail addresses: Glenn.Rudebusch@sf.frb.org and John.C.Williams@sf.frb.org1 Introduction
The Federal Reserve's statutory dual mandate to achieve the goals of full employment and
price stability has been a crucial element in the formulation and conduct of U.S. monetary
policy. However, although not always appreciated, the term \dual" means more than just the
existence of two objectives, for it also connotes a link between those goals. The Federal Open
Market Committee's (FOMC) Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy
(2014) describes this link:
In setting monetary policy, the Committee seeks to mitigate deviations of ina-
tion from its longer-run goal and deviations of employment from the Committee's
assessments of its maximum level. These objectives are generally complementary.
However, under circumstances in which the Committee judges that the objectives
are not complementary, it follows a balanced approach in promoting them, taking
into account the magnitude of the deviations and the potentially dierent time
horizons over which employment and ination are projected to return to levels
judged consistent with its mandate.
That is, the achievement of full employment is viewed as closely intertwined with the achieve-
ment of price stability. Indeed, in standard macroeconomic models, employment and ination
move in the same direction in response to demand-type shocks. This positive comovement, or
complementarity, underlies the so-called divine coincidence of monetary policy, in which the
central bank can simultaneously stabilize both employment and ination by altering a sin-
gle policy instrument|the short-term nominal interest rate. In contrast, supply-type shocks,
which push employment and ination in opposite directions, disrupt this complementarity
and lead to tradeos for monetary policy that must be balanced. In this paper, we introduce
a wedge in the dual mandate that gives demand shocks some of the attributes of a supply
shock, thus leading to monetary policy objectives that are less complementary and to greater
tradeos for monetary policymakers over time.1
The wedge we introduce is based on the prevalence of long-term unemployment and its
distinct properties. For Europe, a well-established literature has argued that the long-term
unemployed are less attached to the labor market than the short-term unemployed and, con-
sequently, have little inuence on wage and price determination. More recently, a variety of
studies have highlighted this same phenomenon in the United States, including Stock (2011),
Gordon (2013), Krueger, Cramer, and Cho (2014), Watson (2014), and the Economic Report
1Another aspect of the close connection between both parts of the dual mandate in the standard framework
arises because the full employment goal is taken as equivalent to the level of employment consistent with price
stability. Or, in the usual terminology, the natural rate of unemployment is equivalent to the non-accelerating
ination rate of unemployment, or NAIRU. See, for example, footnote 17 in the analysis of Yellen (2012).
1of the President from the Council of Economic Advisers (2014, pp. 82-83). Given the unprece-
dented spike in long-term unemployment in the wake of the Great Recession, this research
concludes that long-term unemployment has much less inuence on ination than short-term
unemployment. Although far from dispositive, this evidence suggests that the measure of
slack relevant for determining U.S. ination may also be more narrowly focused on short-term
unemployment than total unemployment.
If the long-term unemployed have little or no eect on wages and prices, a key question for
policy is whether the yardstick for measuring full employment should be similarly adjusted.
That is, should policymakers focus on closing the short-term unemployment gap or, to the same
eect, adjust the natural rate of total unemployment upward to completely oset the greater
number of long-term unemployed. So far, the available evidence does not support such an
approach. As stated by Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen (2014), the long-term unemployed
remain relevant for assessing slack because they \look basically the same as other unemployed
people in terms of their occupations, educational attainment, and other characteristics." That
is, the evidence suggests that the long-term unemployed are able and willing to work and only
dierentiated by the duration of their joblessness.
Indeed, rather than narrowing the denition of slack, some Fed policymakers have instead
indicated that they are considering a more expansive measure for assessing full employment
than just the total unemployment rate. Notably, Yellen (2014) argues for a broad view of full
employment that includes not just the short- and long-term jobless in the benchmark unem-
ployment count but also takes account of the number of discouraged job-seekers and part-time
employees who want full-time work.2 This broad denition implies an even greater separation
between the slack relevant for forecasting ination and the slack relevant for assessing full
employment.3 It is thus consistent in spirit with the alternative framework that we propose,
and the use of this expanded denition of slack would amplify our quantitative results. Still,
for our analysis, we only consider a wedge in the dual mandate resulting from the long-term
unemployed and leave for future research consideration of a more expansive denition of full
employment.
2Similarly, the minutes of the FOMC meeting on January 29, 2014, noted that several participants \pointed
out that broader concepts of the unemployment rate, such as those that include nonparticipants who report
that they want a job and those working part time who want full-time work, remained well above the ocial
unemployment rate, suggesting that considerable labor market slack remained despite the reduction in the
unemployment rate."
3Assuming, for example, that involuntary part-term employees are not integral to wage determination (and
the Phillips curve) perhaps because by expressing a desire for more hours of work at their current wage,
part-time workers have lost bargaining power.
2We begin our investigation of these issues by rst describing how short- and long-term
unemployment can be integrated into a simple model built with three macroeconomic rela-
tionships. The rst of these relates the short-term unemployment share of total unemployment
to the overall business cycle. Although this relationship, which determines an endogenous,
countercyclical short-term share, is new to the literature, it is both intuitive and well supported
in the data. The second equation determines ination and is consistent with the literature
noted earlier that nds that short-term unemployment is the best measure of inationary
gaps in European and U.S. Phillips curves. The third equation is a rudimentary traditional IS
curve or Euler equation that relates unemployment to the nominal short-term interest rate,
which is the monetary policy instrument. Of course, our simple empirical structure is far from
a denitive treatment or the nal word on these issues. However, our evidence, along with
earlier work, seems to support these macroeconomic relationships as plausible ones that are
worthy of further consideration and policy analysis.
Given this simple structure, we then investigate its implications for monetary policy. We
compare optimal monetary policy in this alternative model in which the short-term unemploy-
ment share is determined endogenously and only the short-term unemployed aect ination
to optimal policy in a standard model without those features. From the perspective of the
dual mandate, transitory movements in the short-term unemployment share create a wedge
between the unemployment rate relevant for ination and that relevant for characterizing
maximum employment. This wedge creates a tradeo for monetary policy because it is not
feasible to attain both objectives simultaneously. In our empirical policy analysis, we nd
that movements in the short-term unemployment share can create sizable monetary policy
tradeos. In particular, we use model simulations to show that following the Great Recession,
when the short-term unemployment share was at a historic low, the optimal monetary policy
would allow ination to rise well above levels implied by the standard model and indeed to
overshoot the ination target for a time.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the variation in the share of short-
and long-term unemployment over time in the broader context of the economy. Section 3
discusses the relevance of long-term unemployment for monetary policy in a theoretical setting.
Section 4 provides an empirical analysis of monetary policy and long-term unemployment.
Section 5 concludes.
3Figure 1: Unemployment rate by duration
Note: Shaded bars are NBER recessions.
2 Long-term unemployment and the macroeconomy
Here we consider in broad terms how long-term unemployment ts into the overall economy
from a macroeconomic perspective. First, we examine how cyclical variation induces uctua-
tions in long-term unemployment. Then we consider how long- and short-term unemployment
may have dierent eects on price ination. Finally, we estimate a simple link between total
unemployment and the real interest rate. Again, we do not view this as a comprehensive
or nal analysis of these issues. Instead, these simple empirical relationships motivate our
theoretical analysis and provide a basic empirical calibration of macroeconomic regularities
for our quantitative policy exercise. The thrust of our results do not depend on the specic
functional forms adopted.
2.1 Long-term unemployment and the business cycle
One extraordinary feature of the U.S. labor market in the aftermath of the Great Recession
was the large and persistent rise in the duration of unemployment. As a result, on average,
unemployed job seekers searched much longer for work than in the past. The run-up in the
duration of job search is evident in Figure 1, which plots the total, short-term, and long-term
4unemployment rates, denoted ut, st, and lt.4 All three unemployment rates rose precipitously
as a result of the 2007-2009 recession. However, while the total unemployment rate never
exceeded its post-World War II peak reached in the early 1980s, the long-term unemployment
rate jumped to an unprecedented level, and in 2010, the long-term unemployment rate was
almost twice as high as its peak in earlier postwar recessions.
As shown by the solid line in Figure 2, as long-term unemployment has become more preva-
lent, short-term unemployment as a percentage of total unemployment has trended down. The
short-term unemployment share has also been highly cyclical|posting sizable drops around
every recession|and this cyclical sensitivity has been increasing over time. Most telling is
that the 1990 and 2001 recessions had relatively large incidences of long-term unemployment,
despite being relatively short and shallow macroeconomic contractions. The increasing impor-
tance of long-term unemployment in the United States largely reects the postwar evolution
of labor force demographics and labor market institutions and occupations. Notably, an ag-
ing population and women's rising labor force attachment have shifted the composition of
unemployment toward longer spells (e.g., Aaronson et al. 2010 and Valletta 2011). The in-
creasing share of job losses that are permanent separations rather than temporary layos has
also contributed to longer durations (e.g., Groshen and Potter 2003). The diminished use
of temporary layos in turn may reect the decline of the share of workers in unions and
in manufacturing jobs. The growing cyclical variation in long-term unemployment following
the three most recent recessions also reects the sluggish initial gains in employment|the
so-called jobless recoveries|with associated low job creation and job nding rates.5
Although the number of long-term unemployed has surged in recent years, the latest
episode is actually consistent with the gradual evolution of the share of short- and long-term
unemployment over time. Notably, a simple time-trending model can capture both the secular
and cyclical movements in the duration of unemployment. To model the past half century of
the U.S. short-term unemployment share, which we denote as t = st=ut  100, consider the
regression:
t = 0 + 0  rgapt 1 + 1  TIME + 1  rgapt 1  TIME +   t 1 + t; (1)
where 0, 1, 0, 1, and  are estimated coecients, and TIME is a time trend that equals 1
4We follow the U.S. literature and use a 6-month threshold to delineate short- from long-term unemployment
as in, for example, Aaronson et al. (2010) and Valletta (2013). Specically, st (lt) is measured as the number of
jobless looking for work for 26 weeks or less (more than 26 weeks) as a percentage of the labor force. Research
on European long-term unemployment often uses a one-year threshold.
5Farber and Valletta (2013) also argue that the enhanced availability of extended unemployment benets
following recent recessions can explain a fraction of the elevated long-term unemployment.
5Figure 2: Short-term unemployment as a percentage of total unemployment
Note: Shaded bars are NBER recessions.
in 1960:Q1 and 216 in 2013:Q4, which are the beginning and end of our sample. The resource
gap, rgapt 1, that we use as a cyclical indicator is the dierence between the unemployment
rate and the Congressional Budget Oce (CBO) estimate of the underlying long-term natural
rate of unemployment.6 We will discuss the natural rate in detail below, but for now, we simply
take the unemployment gap, which we denote as ~ ut 1, as a good measure of the macroeconomic
uctuations at a cyclical frequency. (Essentially identical results are obtained from using other
indicators of the business cycle, such as the output gap or industrial capacity utilization.)
Table 1 provides estimates of three variations of equation (1) that have dierent sets of
regressors. The rst column shows estimates of a \static" version that regresses t on a
constant and ~ ut 1. This simple regression provides a benchmark for calibrating our other
results. Its estimated parameters imply a sample average short-term unemployment share of
almost 86 percent of total unemployment. In addition, the average sample cyclical sensitivity
is about 4.7, that is, each percentage point increase in the unemployment gap is associated
with a 4.7 percentage point reduction in the short-term share. However, the static regression
does not capture the growing secular and cyclical importance of long-term unemployment
6The CBO estimates this natural rate for use in its analysis of potential output, so it incorporates only
long-lasting structural factors and excludes uctuations in aggregate demand. See CBO (2014). We lag this
gap to help avoid the simultaneity of having current unemployment on both sides of the equation.
6Table 1: Short-term unemployment share (t) regression
Variations of Regression
Static Static trending Dynamic trending
Constant 85.94 (0.523) 91.03 (1.011) 22.02 (3.26)
t 1 0.76 (0.035)
~ ut 1 -4.73 (0.668) -0.79 (0.565) -0.41 (0.16)
~ ut 1  TIME -0.025 (0.0042) -0.006 (0.0015)
TIME -0.043 (0.0078) -0.010 (0.0030)
Total long-run cyclical
eect as of 2013:Q4
-4.73 -6.17 -7.20
R2 .70 .90 .99
SER 4.91 2.83 1.02
Notes: Heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent standard errors in parentheses.
Estimation sample is from 1960:Q1 to 2013:Q4.
over time. These evolutionary changes are captured in the \static trending" regression that
includes terms that interact the constant and the unemployment gap with a time trend (the
second and third regressors in equation (1)). These two trend interaction terms are highly
statistically signicant and substantially improve t, so the R2 jumps from 0.7 to 0.9. This
very close t is evident in Figure 2, which displays the tted values of the static trending
regression as a dashed line.7 The cyclical sensitivity implied by the static, trending regression
increased substantially over the sample, ranging from -0.77 in 1960:Q1 to -6.17 in 2013:Q4.
The most recent estimate of that sensitivity is shown in the row just above the R2.8
Given the autocorrelated tting errors evident in Figure 2, the nal regression variation
adds a lagged dependent variable, and estimates of the resulting \dynamic trending" speci-
cation are shown in the nal column of Table 1. In this most general specication, the R2
reaches an impressive 0.99. At the end of the sample, the long-run cyclical eect (calculated as
(0+1216)=(1 0:76)) implies that a 1 percentage point increase in the unemployment gap
is associated with about a 7.2 percentage point drop in the short-term unemployment share.
It is this estimate of the current cyclical sensitivity of t that we will employ in Section 3 to
investigate the monetary policy implications of our model with short-term unemployment.
7In contrast, the tted values from the static regression without a time trend (not shown) clearly overpredict
cyclical uctuations in t in the rst half of the sample and underpredict those uctuations in the second half.
8The total cyclical eect as of 2013:Q4 is calculated from the estimated coecients as 0 + 1  216.
72.2 Long-term unemployment and ination
Since the late 1980s, a number of researchers have found evidence that wage and price deter-
mination are little aected by variation in long-term unemployment. There are two potential
underlying rationales for this reduced eect on ination. On the one hand, the long-term
unemployed may be less tied to the labor market because they grow discouraged and search
less intensely for a job (e.g., Krueger and Mueller, 2011). The long-term unemployed are also
viewed as less desirable applicants, as there is much casual and econometric evidence that
employers view a long ongoing spell of unemployment as a negative signal for hiring (e.g.,
Eriksson and Rooth, 2014). In the extreme, the long-term unemployed may be essentially
segmented from the active labor market with little role in the setting of wages and prices.9
In Europe, where long-term unemployment has long been prevalent, considerable evidence
has accumulated over the past three decades that long-term unemployment has little if any
inuence on wages and prices. Early on, Nickell (1987) and Manning (1994) found a sig-
nicant association between wage ination and short-term unemployment but not long-term
unemployment. In addition, Llaudes (2005) estimated Phillips curves that allow for dierent
reactions of ination to short- and long-term unemployment rates for a sample of 19 OECD
countries. He found that in most Western European countries, the long-term unemployed
appeared largely detached from the wage bargaining and price setting process.
In contrast, in the United States, there have been no comparable long-established results
documenting the dierential eect of short- and long-term unemployment on ination. Of
course, as noted above, until very recently, long-term unemployment was a minor element in
U.S. labor dynamics. Therefore, it was hard to discern whether U.S. and European ination
dynamics appeared to dier because there was very little independent variation in U.S. long-
term unemployment or because the wage and price determination mechanism in the United
States truly did not distinguish between short- and long-term unemployment. With the surge
of U.S. long-term unemployment following the Great Recession, the rst consideration|the
observation problem|has largely disappeared and the issue of whether the United States is
\like Europe" in exhibiting a weak link between long-term unemployment and ination could
be addressed to a much greater extent than in the past. Accordingly, there has been a resur-
gence of research on the role of unemployment duration in determining ination in the United
States. Early on, Stock (2011) noted that distinguishing between long- and short-term unem-
ployment had the potential to account for the puzzling lack of disination following the Great
9Cast in terms of the insider-outsider labor market models, the long-term unemployed, as outsiders, are sep-
arated from the active labor market and have little inuence on wage bargaining, while the newly unemployed
or employed insiders have some inuence regarding compensation.
8Recession. Following this same logic, Gordon (2013) nds that short-term unemployment
performs better than total unemployment in predicting price ination since the start of the
nancial crisis and Great Recession in 2007.10 Finally, Krueger, Cramer, and Cho (2014) and
the Council of Economic Advisers (2014, pp, 82-83) come to a similar conclusion using simple
specications that consider wage dynamics as well as price dynamics.
We examine the dierential role of short- and long-term unemployment using a standard
expectations-augmented Phillips curve for quarterly core PCE price ination (measured at an
annual rate in percent):11
t =  + 1  t 1 + 2  t 2 + (1   1   2)  lrt 1 +   igapt 1 + t; (2)
where , 1, 2, and  are estimated coecients. In this equation, ination, t, depends on
two lags of past ination, a survey-based measure of long-run ination expectations, lrt 1,
and a cyclical indicator, igapt 1, of the inationary gap relevant for forecasting future price
ination. The lags of ination capture medium and high frequency dynamics, while the
long-run ination expectations capture the low-frequency stochastic trend component of U.S.
ination.12
Table 2 provides estimates of three variants of equation (2) that use dierent measures of
the inationary gap. The rst column uses as that indicator ~ ut 1, which as noted above is the
dierence between the total unemployment rate and the CBO's measure of the underlying long-
run natural rate. This measure of unused labor market resources is statistically signicant, and
in economic terms, a percentage point of unemployment gap reduces annualized ination by
about 0.13 percentage point in the next quarter. The second and third columns estimate the
Phillips curve using the short-term unemployment gap, denoted ~ st 1, which is the dierence
between the short-term unemployment rate and a non-accelerating ination rate of short-term
unemployment, denoted NAIRU-S, and the long-term unemployment gap, denoted ~ lt 1, which
10Gordon (2013) continues his investigation|started in the late 1970s|of U.S. ination dynamics using a
Phillips curve that has displayed remarkable continuity and t over time. Gordon's ination specication has
evolved a bit over time. For example, in recent decades, uctuations in food and energy prices are allowed to
have a lower pass-through to consumer price ination than earlier in the sample.
11The Phillips curve used by Gordon (2013) includes about 20 additional regressors for supply shocks as well
as very long lags of past ination. Our results are little changed by including these control variables (and the
regression standard error falls by about 10 percent). Our results are also essentially unaected by replacing
the long-run ination expectations variable with a long distributed lag of past ination. In both cases, we
prefer to use our simple structure in our monetary policy analysis below to highlight the policy implications
of the separation of the long-term unemployed from price determination.
12Using long-run ination expectations to anchor ination dynamics is common, and we follow Reifschneider,
Wascher, and Wilcox (2013) in using a series based on long-run expected ination in the Survey of Professional
Forecasters and the Hoey survey since 1980 and, before that, on a long moving average of actual ination.
9Table 2: Ination regression
Three measures of igap
Total Short-term Split
t 1 0.591 (0.106) 0.580 (0.106) 0.580 (0.106)
t 2 0.246 (0.096) 0.262 (0.092) 0.264 (0.093)
lrt 1 0.162 (0.064) 0.158 (0.062) 0.156 (0.062)
~ ut 1 -0.133 (0.039)
~ st 1 -0.246 (0.065) -0.251 (0.071)
~ lt 1 0.012 (0.058)
constant 0.059 (0.054) 0.036 (0.052) 0.033 (0.0569)
R2 .87 .87 .87
SER 0.792 0.785 0.787
Notes: Heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent standard errors in parentheses.
Estimation sample is from 1960:Q1 to 2013:Q4.
is the dierence between the long-term unemployment rate and a non-accelerating ination
rate of long-term unemployment, denoted NAIRU-L.13 Comparing the columns in Table 2, it's
clear that the short-term unemployment gap is a much more important determinant of ination
than the long-term unemployment gap|consistent with the accumulating evidence noted
above. As shown in the third column of Table 2, which splits ~ ut 1 into short- and long-term
unemployment gaps, after controlling for short-term unemployment, long-term unemployment
has no residual information. Its coecient is not signicantly dierent from zero (with the
wrong sign), and formally, the hypothesis of the equality of the ~ st 1 and ~ lt 1 coecients in
Table 2 can be rejected at the 1 percent level.
Figure 3 plots rgapt = ~ ut 1 and igapt = ~ st 1|the traditional unemployment resource
gap and the short-term unemployment inationary gap. Over the entire earlier part of the
sample, the two gaps are closely correlated, which accounts for the past diculty in discerning a
dierent eect on U.S. ination of short- and long-term unemployment. The largest deviations
between these gaps are recorded in the years since 2010, which reects the signicant run-up
13To construct NAIRU-S and NAIRU-L, we distribute the CBO's total unemployment natural rate according
to the trend in the share of short-term unemployment in total unemployment (t). That is, NAIRU-S at date
t is the CBO natural rate multiplied by the tted t trend (calculated as 0 + 1  t) from the static trending
regression. We obtained very similar results using estimates of NAIRU-S from Watson (2014), who estimates a
time-varying NAIRU-S embedded in an estimated Phillips curve that, as in Gordon (2013), includes additional
regressors for supply shocks and long lags of past ination.
10Figure 3: Total unemployment rgap and short-term unemployment igap
Note: Shaded bars are NBER recessions.
in long-term unemployment during that period, and it is this episode that provides the recent
power in discerning the lack of long-term unemployment's eect on ination.
Similar in-sample results are provided in a much simpler specication in Krueger, Cramer,
and Cho (2014) and in a more comprehensive specication in Gordon (2013). Gordon (2013)
also argues that for highly inertial autoregressive models like the Phillips curve a better tech-
nique for model assessment is dynamic simulation, which produces multi-step-ahead forecasts
in which the lagged ination variable is generated endogenously. As in Gordon (2013), we
obtain a clear dierentiation between the total unemployment and short-term unemployment
measures of the ination gap using dynamic simulations. In Figure 4, we run dynamic simula-
tions of ination starting in 2006:Q4 using the total and short-term regression estimates from
Table 2. The Phillips curve using ~ st 1|the dashed line|tracks the restrained downshift in
ination very well. In contrast, the Phillips curve using ~ ut 1|the dotted line|undershoots
actual ination by 2 to 3 percentage points starting in 2009.
All in all, a fairly good case can be made that ination dynamics in the United States are
related to short-term unemployment and that the long-term unemployed appear to exert little
pressure on wages and prices. In a European context, of course, such a dierentiation would
not be surprising given the long history of evidence to that eect. Still, no result regarding
11Figure 4: Dynamic forecasts of ination using short-term and total unemployment
the empirical Phillips curve|even its existence|seems to be established incontrovertibly.14
For example, Kiley (2014) employs data for U.S. metropolitan regions to argue that short-
and long-term unemployment exert equal downward pressure on price ination. At the very
least though, the preponderance of U.S and international evidence suggests that monetary
policymakers should consider the ramications of a wedge between the amount of resource
slack and the inationary gap, a topic we examine below.
2.3 Unemployment and interest rates
For our monetary policy analysis, the nal requisite relationship is between unemployment
and the short-term interest rate. As a rst approximation, we assume a simple empirical
formulation of the standard IS curve or Euler equation that relates the total unemployment
gap to a real interest rate:
~ ut = 1:57  ~ ut 1   0:62  ~ ut 2+ :028  ((it 1   t 1 + it 2   t 2)=2   2:25 ) + t (3)
(0:07) (0:07) (:010) (0:62)
where it is the quarterly average federal funds rate in percent. This equation relates the overall
unemployment gap to two lags of the gap and the average real interest rate over the past two
14Many of the variations and hypotheses regarding empirical Phillips curves are painstakingly examined by
Mavroeidis, Plagborg-Mller, and Stock (2014).
12quarters. The coecients (and standard errors in parentheses) are estimated over the sample
from 1960:Q1 through 2007:Q4, and the R2 = 0:97 and  = 0:24. The early sample end
date is chosen to avoid the period when short-term interest rates were constrained by the zero
lower bound.15 Although in this formulation, interest rates aect aggregate demand, with
the cyclical variation in the short-term unemployment share, interest rates will also have a
dierential eect on long- and short-term unemployment that we explore below.
3 Monetary policy: theoretical analysis
The preceding section provided some evidence for two possible features of the economy: that
short-term rather than total unemployment inuences price setting, and that the short-term
share of total unemployment is procyclical. This section characterizes optimal monetary pol-
icy in the context of a highly stylized static model that also displays these two attributes.
The theoretical framework employed is very simple, which facilitates derivation of analytical
results. The next section explores the quantitative implications for monetary policy using a
dynamic model that is calibrated to the empirical results in section 2. Although it is not
possible to derive analytical results for that dynamic empirical model, it allows us to gauge
the quantitative import of the implications for optimal monetary policy.
3.1 Stylized static model
Our stylized static model economy is described by equations for the aggregate unemployment
rate, the short-term unemployment rate, the ination rate, and the short-term nominal inter-
est rate. Consistent with much research and central bank practice, we assume that the central
bank sets the short-term nominal interest rate to minimize the weighted sum of squared de-
viations of the ination rate from its target rate and the squared deviations of the aggregate
unemployment rate from its natural rate. Given the distinction between short-and long-term
unemployment in the model developed in this paper, we need to make further assumptions
regarding the implications of the short-term unemployment share on the natural rate of aggre-
gate unemployment. We assume the natural rate of aggregate unemployment is unaected by
transitory movements in the short-run unemployment share. That is, transitory movements
in the short-run unemployment share have nominal eects, but do not directly aect the equi-
librium of the real side of the economy. In the parlance of DSGE models, we view the eect of
15Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) provide support for an almost identical empirical aggregate demand
relationship. Also, see Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2004) for discussion of the evidence for expectations in the
Euler equation.
13time variation in the short-term unemployment share on ination dynamics as an additional
type of nominal friction that does not aect natural rates.16
Specically, the central bank's objective is to minimize the quadratic loss:
L = ~ 
2 + ~ u
2; (4)
where ~  denotes the deviation of the ination rate from its target level and ~ u is the deviation
of the aggregate unemployment rate from its natural rate. The parameter   0 is the xed
weight the policymaker places on unemployment stabilization relative to ination stabilization.
The target ination rate is assumed to be constant.
The aggregate unemployment rate is determined by a stylized IS equation:
~ u = ~ i + v; (5)
where ~ i denotes the deviation of the short-term interest rate from its natural rate, and v
is a demand shock.17 For analytical convenience, the unemployment rate is assumed to be
positively related to the nominal interest rate, rather than the real interest rate, but this
assumption does not materially aect the main results. The ination rate is determined by:
~  =  ~ s + e; (6)
where ~ s is the deviation of the short-term unemployment rate from its natural rate, and e is
an ination shock.
The share of aggregate unemployment made up of short-term unemployed, denoted by ,
is assumed to be negatively related to the deviation of the aggregate unemployment rate from
its natural rate, as follows:
 =     ~ u + z; (7)
where   is the steady-state level of , and z is a short-term unemployment share shock. This
equation abstracts from the restriction that  is constrained to be between 0 and 1. In the
following, we consider environments where the range of variation in  does not reach these
bounds. By denition, the short-term unemployment rate is given by: s  u. This can be
16In addition, we assume that in the absence of shocks, it is possible to achieve both aggregate unemployment
and ination goals; that is, the steady state of the economy is not characterized by distortions as in Barro and
Gordon (1983).
17In this model, each shock is assumed to be mean zero with nite variance and independent of the other
shocks.
14rewritten as follows:
~ s = ~ u +  u    s; (8)
where  u and  s are the natural rates for aggregate and short-term unemployment, respectively.
The steady-state value of  is assumed to satisfy the following condition:   =  s= u. This implies
that the steady-state short-term and aggregate unemployment rates equal their respective
natural rates.
3.2 Optimal monetary policy: exogenous 
We rst consider the case of strictly exogenous variation in , that is,  = 0. The central bank
is assumed to observe the three shocks v, e, and z before setting the short-term interest rate.18
Given the structure of the model and the central bank's objective function, the optimal policy
decision can be equivalently described as choosing the deviation of the unemployment rate
from its natural rate. After substitutions, the central bank's objective can be rewritten as:
L = ( + 
2
2)~ u
2 + (2
2 uz   2e)~ u + e
2 + 
2 u
2z
2   2 uze: (9)
Taking the derivative with respect to ~ u yields the rst-order condition describing the optimal
setting for the deviation of the unemployment rate from the natural rate, denoted ~ u:
~ u
 =

 + 22e  
2 u
 + 22z: (10)
Substituting for short-term unemployment yields the optimal value of the deviation of the
short-term unemployment rate from its natural rate, denoted by ~ s:
~ s
 =
2
 + 22e +
 u
 + 22z: (11)
Substituting for ination yields the optimal value of the deviation of the ination rate from
its target, denoted by ~ :
~ 
 =

 + 22e  
 u
 + 22z: (12)
In response to shocks to demand and ination, optimal policy displays two textbook prin-
ciples of monetary policy. First, it completely osets the eects of a demand shock, regardless
of the central bank's weight on unemployment stabilization in its objective function (i.e., v
18In this section, we abstract from the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates and any other factors
that might constrain movements in the short-term interest rates.
15does not show up in the rst-order conditions). The demand shock in this model creates a
\divine coincidence" of goals, where unemployment and ination stabilization are perfectly
aligned and there is no tradeo between the two objectives. Second, the ination shock, e,
creates a short-run tradeo between the two goals, and the optimal levels of unemployment
and ination depend on the degree of concern for unemployment stabilization. In the lim-
iting case of  = 0, where the policymaker cares only about ination, the optimal policy
acts to create a deviation of short-term unemployment from its natural rate that completely
osets the shock's eect on ination. For  > 0, the optimal policy partially osets the eect
of a positive (negative) ination shock on ination by raising (lowering) the unemployment
rate. This response reects the standard tradeo between the ination and unemployment
objectives inherent with an ination shock.
The z shocks to  create a tradeo between the ination and unemployment goals and
act like ination shocks (of the opposite sign) in their implications for optimal monetary
policy. When  deviates from its steady-state level, it creates a wedge between the aggregate
unemployment rate that the central bank cares about and the short-term unemployment
rate that aects ination. In the case of a positive shock to  (z > 0), a given aggregate
unemployment rate implies a higher short-term unemployment rate and a lower ination rate.
In response to such a shock, if  > 0, optimal policy calls for a lower aggregate unemployment
rate and a lower ination rate. That is, it acts just like a negative ination shock. Similarly,
a negative shock to  calls for an increase in aggregate unemployment and ination. As in
the case of an ination shock, the magnitude of the response of unemployment and ination
depends on the relative weight on unemployment in the loss function. In the limiting case of
 = 0, the optimal response to a shock to  is to move aggregate unemployment so that the
short-term unemployment rate remains at its natural rate, which keeps the ination rate at
its target.
Exogenous variation in the value of  has one additional implication for optimal policy.
Because  aects the slope of the Phillips curve with respect to aggregate unemployment,
it changes the optimal response to an ination shock. In the case of  = 0, the optimal
increase in the unemployment rate is decreasing in the value of  because a given movement
in unemployment has a larger eect on ination and therefore a smaller move is needed. More
generally, the eect of  on the magnitude of the optimal response to an ination shock cannot
be signed a priori. If  > 0, there is a countervailing eect of a larger unemployment eect
on ination improving the ination-unemployment tradeo. This tends to make the optimal
response larger when  is higher. The net eect of these two inuences depends on model
parameters. In any case, there is an asymmetry in the responses to shocks that depends on
16the value of .
3.3 Optimal monetary policy: endogenous 
We now consider the case of endogenous variation in ; that is:  > 0. As before, the optimal
policy fully osets demand shocks. After incorporating the endogenous behavior of , the loss
is given by:
L = ~ u
2 +

 (    ~ u + z)~ u    u( ~ u + z) + e
2
: (13)
After expanding and collecting terms, this yields the following expression:
L = 
2
2~ u
4 (14)
 

2
2(     u + z)

~ u
3
+

 + 
2(     u + z)
2   2
2 uz + 2e

~ u
2
+

 2
2 u
2z + 2
2 u(  + z)z   2(  + z)e + 2 ue

~ u
+ e
2 + 
2 u
2z
2   2 uez:
The resulting rst-order condition is given by:
0 = 2
2
2~ u
3 (15)
 

3
2(     u + z)

~ u
2
+

 + 
2(     u + z)
2   2
2 uz + 2e

~ u
  (     u + z)e + 
2 u(     u + z)z:
This equation describing the optimal policy is a cubic equation in ~ u. Given the nonlinear
nature of the model economy, one must pay attention to the second-order condition and select
the root to this equation that yields the smallest loss. Of course, for the special case of  = 0,
the higher-order terms drop out leaving the same condition for optimal policy as before.
Relative to the model with purely exogenous variation in , the decreasing marginal ef-
fectiveness of policy for higher unemployment rates has countervailing eects on the optimal
setting of policy, and it is not in general possible to analytically sign the net eect. The rst
eect calls for greater policy response to counteract the diminishing marginal eectiveness of
unemployment on ination. The second, osetting eect calls for a lesser response because the
tradeo has worsened in terms of the marginal costs of aggregate unemployment in reducing
ination. The sign of the net eect of these eects depends on the weight on unemployment
gaps in the loss function, , and the sensitivity of ination to aggregate unemployment.
17Although it is not possible in general to characterize the eects of endogenous time-
variation in  on optimal policy and outcomes, the local rst-order dynamics of this system
in the vicinity of the steady state are nearly the same as the model with  = 0. That is, in
the vicinity of the steady state, the qualitative results from the model with only exogenous
variation in  carry over to the model with endogenous variation, and endogenous variation in
 primarily aects higher-order terms. In the case of an ination shock, the rst-order eect
on the optimal setting of ~ u, evaluated at e = z = 0, is given by:
d~ u
de
   
e=z=0
=
(     u)
 + 2(     u)2: (16)
The term      u now appears in both the numerator and denominator of the expression. A
corresponding change occurs in the rst-order response to a shock to .
In addition, one can fully characterize the implications for optimal policy in the special case
of  = 0. The goal of the central bank is then to equate the ination rate to its target, if that is
feasible. The response of the short-term unemployment share to the aggregate unemployment
rate, however, creates a nonlinearity in the relationship between aggregate unemployment
and the ination rate, which limits the ability of monetary policy to oset large shocks that
raise the ination rate. Specically, there is a level of ~ u at which ination actually rises with a
further increase in ~ u. It is clearly never optimal to exceed this threshold, given by: ~ u =
   u+z
2 .
When the combination of shocks to ination and the short-term unemployment share call for
an even higher unemployment rate, the optimal policy sets ~ u = ~ u and the ination rate exceeds
the target. The role of ~ u is seen in the optimality condition for monetary policy when the
upper bound is not binding:
~ u
( = 0) = ~ u  
n
~ u
2   (e    uz)=()
o0:5
: (17)
Relative to the case of  = 0, optimal policy must take into account the eect of unemployment
on the share of short-term unemployment and thereby on ination. For example, in the case
of a positive ination shock, optimal policy boosts the aggregate unemployment rate, which in
turn raises the share of long-term unemployed. As a result, on the margin, it takes more of an
increase in aggregate unemployment to bring down ination. In response to negative ination
shocks, policy lowers the unemployment rate, which boosts the short-term unemployment
share. This channel increases the eectiveness of the policy action, and thus reduces the size
of the reduction in unemployment needed to keep ination on target.
More generally, one needs to numerically compute the implications for monetary policy.
18Figure 5: Optimal monetary policy responses to shocks
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ination rate from its target level.
Figure 5 illustrates these theoretical results using a particular parameterization of the model
with dierent values of . For this purpose, the following parameter values are used:  =
1; = 0:5;  u = 5; and   = 0:8.19 For each shock, the optimal responses of the unemployment
and ination rates are computed, assuming the value of the other shocks are zero. The demand
shock is not shown because the optimal policy perfectly osets it. Note that these exercises
are for illustrative purposes only. A more careful quantitative analysis is conducted in the next
section using the dynamic empirical model. The black solid lines show the optimal outcomes
for the model with  = 0. In this case, the optimal response to the ination shock is linear
19In the model simulations,  is computed as a share and is not multiplied by 100.
19in the shock. In contrast, the optimal response of the unemployment rate to the shock to 
displays asymmetry, with the optimal response of the unemployment rate somewhat larger for
positive shocks to  than for negative shocks.
In this example, the endogenous responses of  do not qualitatively change the nature of
the optimal responses to the shocks, but do aect the quantitative results, especially for large
shocks. The red dashed lines in the gure show the outcomes under optimal policy in the case
of  = 0:05; the blue dash-dot lines show the corresponding results for the model with  = 0:1.
There is an asymmetry in the response to the ination shock and greater asymmetry in the
optimal responses to the shock to . Given the nonlinear nature of the model, the degree
of asymmetry can be sensitive to model parameters, especially the parameter describing the
preferences of the central bank, .
4 Monetary policy: empirical analysis
The preceding section explored the qualitative implications of short-term unemployment af-
fecting price setting in a stylized static model. In this section, we leverage the empirical results
in Section 3 to gauge the quantitative importance of these eects. Specically, we use a model
has three estimated equations for the short-term unemployment share, ination, and the total
unemployment gap:
t = 19:9   1:76  ~ ut 1 + :76  t 1 + t; = 1:02;
t = :58t 1 + :26t 2 + :16lrt 1   :25~ st 1 + :04 + t; = :79;
~ ut = 1:57~ ut 1   :62~ ut 2 + :027((it 1   t 1 + it 2   t 2)=2   2:16) + t; = :24:
The rst equation is based on the dynamic trending regression results in Table 1 evaluated
at the end of the sample (i.e., TIME = 216). The second equation is based on the ination
regression in Table 2 that uses the short-term unemployment rate to form the inationary
gap. The nal equation is the simple estimated aggregate demand relationship given at the
end of Section 2.
Because this short-term unemployment (STU) model is nonlinear, we are not able to
use available methods to compute the optimal policy solution to the model. Instead, we
characterize optimal policy in the simulations using the approach of optimal policy projections
developed by Svensson and Tetlow (2005). Specically, we compute model projections over a
nite horizon assuming that all future innovations equal zero. Monetary policy is set period-
20by-period to minimize the discounted loss function:
Lt =
1 X
j=0


j(~ 
2
t+j + ~ u
2
t+j +  (it+j   it+j 1)
2)
	
; (18)
where  is a discount factor set arbitrarily close to unity (0.999), and   is the relative weight on
squared rst-dierences in the nominal federal funds rate. The ination target is assumed to be
2 percent, consistent with the statement by the Federal Open Market Committee (2014). The
resource gap that the central bank strives to close is the deviation of the total unemployment
rate from the natural rate of unemployment, which is the current estimate by the Congressional
Budget Oce (2014). We assume equal weights on the ination and unemployment terms in
the loss; that is,  = 1. This approach to analyzing optimal policy has been used, for example,
by Yellen (2012).
We also include a small penalty on interest rate changes that was absent in our theoretical
model.20 Specically, we set   = 0:1. Inclusion of this term has an important implication for
optimal policy: It is no longer optimal to immediately and fully oset demand shocks. Instead,
in response to a demand shock, it is optimal to gradually bring the aggregate unemployment
rate back to its natural rate. Given, the procyclical behavior of the short-term unemployment
share, this gradualism implies that a demand shock will endogenously create a wedge between
the unemployment and ination goals. In particular, in the STU model with time-varying
labor force heterogeneity, demand shocks will create tradeos for monetary policymakers.
We use model simulations starting from the end of our data sample and compare op-
timal policy and the evolution of the economy in the STU model to the alternatives in a
standard macroeconomic model that does not distinguish between short- and long-term un-
employment.21 Because the recent period has been characterized by a very low short-term
unemployment share, it provides an excellent case study of the potential magnitude of these
eects. Note that these simple model-based simulations are presented to illustrate the quanti-
tative importance of the distinction between short- and long-run unemployment. Importantly,
they should not be viewed as realistic forecasts or depictions of potentially feasible outcomes
over the simulation period because they ignore many other factors inuencing the economic
outlook. We simulate the model starting in the rst quarter of 2014, taking the actual data
20Rudebusch (2006, 2013) cautions that a sizable penalty on interest rate volatility has very weak theoretical
and empirical justications.
21It should be noted that our results are somewhat conservative because we have xed the coecients of the
short-term unemployment share equation to their values as of 2013:Q4 based on the dynamic trending regres-
sion. Instead, if recent trends toward more and more cyclically sensitive long-term unemployment continue,
the eects we document will be larger.
21Figure 6: Optimal monetary policy responses to shocks
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through 2013 as initial conditions. In implementing this method, we truncate the simulation
length to 200 periods. The algorithm uses a hill-climbing technique to nd the jointly optimal
setting of the federal funds rate in all periods.
The extremely low level of the short-term unemployment share that prevails at the start
of the simulation creates a sizable tradeo between unemployment and ination that is absent
in the standard model. Figure 6 shows the simulation results from the estimated model along
with those from an otherwise standard model where the aggregate unemployment gap (the
dierence between the aggregate unemployment rate and its natural rate) aects ination.
To make the two models comparable, the coecient on the aggregate unemployment gap in
the ination equation of the standard model is multiplied by the steady-state value of . At
the end of 2013, there is only a modest short-term unemployment gap while the aggregate
unemployment gap is relatively large. As implied by the theoretical model, this unusually
22low level of  implies an optimal policy that pushes the ination rate above the 2 percent
target for a time, balancing these deviations against the benet of reducing the aggregate
unemployment gap. Optimal policy is somewhat more restrictive in our model than in the
standard model, and the unemployment gap is accordingly modestly higher. These results are
robust to alternative settings of the loss function parameters.
Although the simulation results are only illustrative, they reinforce the main conclusion
from the theoretical analysis. Specically, with a dual policy objective of minimizing both
aggregate unemployment and ination gaps, the optimal policy response to a shock to the
short-term unemployment share balances misses in the ination goal against those in the
unemployment goal. According to our estimated model, during the recent recession and
recovery, this tradeo has been quantitatively important.
5 Conclusion
This paper has highlighted the amplied tradeo between the objectives of full employment
and mandate-consistent ination that occurs when the long-term unemployed have little ef-
fect on ination but are still included in the overall resource gap relevant for setting monetary
policy. During the Great Recession and subsequent recovery, the share of short-term unem-
ployment relative to total unemployment reached a historic low, and according to our empirical
analysis, this created a sizable wedge between the Federal Reserve's dual objectives. Although
this wedge is likely to be transitory, it does create a greater tradeo for monetary policymakers.
As noted in the introduction, this issue is broader than the short- and long-term unemploy-
ment split studied here. During the recent recession and recovery, the number of discouraged
jobless excluded from the unemployment rate and the number of part-time employees want-
ing full-time work have reached historic highs. If the true measure of labor underutilization
included these individuals, even though they have little or no eect on wage and price setting,
then the wedge in the Fed's dual mandate would be even wider. Based on the analysis in
this paper, the implications are clear: Optimal policy should trade o a transitory period of
excessive ination (beyond what is calculated using this paper's model) in order to bring the
broader measure of underemployment to normal levels more quickly.
Finally, while we have focused on the U.S. experience, the evidence for dierences be-
tween short- and long-term unemployment is, if anything, stronger for many other countries.
Extending the empirical analysis to these other countries where the eects are likely more
prevalent is an important avenue for future research.
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